Some Thought on the Thought of Nishitani Keiji by DeMartino Richard J.
Some Thoughts on the Thought 
of Nishitani Keiji
Richard J. Demartino
Nishitani Keiji was undoubtedly one of the most learned and fertile 
religiously oriented philosophical minds of the twentieth century. Very 
few thinkers were as well-versed as he in the overall thought of the East 
and the West, ancient and modern, regardless of whether the thought 
was religiously inclined, purporting to deal with science, or in some 
other manner avowedly secular. This intimate familiarity, moreover, 
was not as a rule derived from translations or secondary commentaries. 
It was, rather, the result primarily of his own close reading and study 
of original texts in their original languages. Nor was this learning 
or knowledge confined to non-fictional philosophical or religious writ­
ings. It extended as well to works of fiction, both prose and poetry. 
Furthermore, not only could he read fluently in German, French, and 
English, among other languages, he could also speak quite fluently in 
them—although, tending to be somewhat shy as well as modest, he was 
usually reluctant to do so.
For example, despite the fact that I already had the privilege to work 
with him for almost two years (from the fall of 1958 to the late spring 
of 1960) on English translations of his articles “What is Religion?*’1 
and “Science and Zen,”2 it was not until the late spring of 1960 that I 
really heard him “speak” in English. It occurred at a welcoming party 
(kangei-kai) held in Kyoto for Paul Tillich, who was, in May and June 
of 1960, visiting (and lecturing in) Japan as guest of the Japanese
1 Keiji Nishitani, “What is Religion?** Philosophical Studies of Japan, II (1960), 
pp. 21-64.
2 Keiji Nishitani, “Science and Zen,*’ Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. I, No.l 
(September 1965), pp. 79-108.
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Ministry of Education. When it came time, at the Kyoto gathering, for 
Nishitani, widely acknowledged to be one of the doyens of Japanese— 
and especially Kyoto—scholars, to offer his greeting, he arose from his 
seat at the Western-style table, and, speaking in English, began: 
“While I think that I have the ‘courage to be,’ I am not at all sure that I 
have the ‘courage to speak in English,’ at least not publicly.” From 
whence he proceeded, in his characteristically slow but steady manner, 
to deliver in English a perfectly competent and charmingly engaging 
welcome.
Also worthy of note, I believe, is that he never paraded his massive 
accumulation of information and learning ostentatiously. Quite the 
reverse, it always made its presence felt inconspicuously in connection 
with a particular philosophical or religious point that he was trying to 
make either in his writing or in his teaching.
With respect to his teaching, besides his lecture courses, which were 
customarily attended by literally scores of students, his smaller classes 
were normally devoted to a rigorously careful reading and explication 
of a classical or germinal text by, for instance, Nishida, Heidegger, 
Sartre, Kierkegaard, Hakuin, DOgen, Descartes, Augustine, and the 
like. His wide-ranging scholarship regularly enabled him to come up 
with unusual and unexpected—but invariably appropriate—couplings 
or linkages to facilitate the elucidation, contrast, or comparison that 
he was after. For these several reasons, I feel assured that he can, with 
complete justification, be said to have been a truly global thinker.
Regarding his own personal religious and philosophical concerns, 
they eventually came to be centered chiefly around Zen Buddhism. 
This was a direct consequence of his agonizing struggle with his own 
personal or existential religious and philosophical problem: that of 
nihilism. For Nishitani, ‘‘Nihilism here means that something fun­
damental has been lost from our existence, and that all life has become 
ultimately meaningless.”3 Or, again, “Nihility,” as he also terms 
it, refers to “a nothingness set in opposition to being, a relative 
nothingness,"4 “that which renders meaningless the meaning of life.”5
3 Keiji Nishitani, “The Religious Situation in Present-Day Japan,” Contemporary 
Religions in Japan, I, No. 1 (March 1960), p. 18.
4 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, translated with an introduction by Jan 
Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 123.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
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As he was to reveal in a subsequent remembrance:
My life as a young man can be described in a single phrase: it 
was a period absolutely without hope. . . . My life at the time 
lay entirely in the grips of nihility and despair. . . . My deci­
sion, then, to study philosophy was in fact—melodramatic as 
it might sound—a matter of life and death. . . .6
6 Quoted from ibid., Translator’s Introduction, p. xxxv.
’ See W., pp. 137-138.
8 See Keiji Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, translated by Graham 
Parkes (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), fn. 15 to the Translator’s 
Introduction, p. 195.
9 See ibid.
10 Quoted from Hans Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness, translated by J. W. Heisig 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1980), p. 50.
Searching for a way to deal with the threat of an ever-menacing 
destructive, relative, or negative7 nothingness that he saw hovering 
over—or underlying—human personal and historical existence, he 
began to consider that the possibility for a solution to this problem 
might be found in—or through—Zen Buddhism. Recalling his early 
questing, which included “his enthusiastic reading of Plotinus, 
Eckhart, Boehme, and the later Schelling’’8 and “his avid readings of 
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Ibsen, and Strindberg, as well as of Nietzsche,”9 
Nishitani observed:
Before I began my philosophical training as a disciple of 
Nishida, I was most attracted by Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, 
Emerson and Carlyle, and also by the Bible and St. Francis of 
Assisi. Among things Japanese, I liked best Natsume Sdseki 
and books like the Buddhist talks by Hakuin and Takuan. 
Throughout all these multiple interests, one fundamental con­
cern was constantly at work, I think. ... In the center of 
that whirlwind lurked doubt about the very existence of the 
self, something like the Buddhist “Great Doubt” or daigi. 
Thus I soon started paying attention to Zen.10
This interest in Zen did not interfere, but actually went along, with 
his philosophical interest—since both, in his view, had to do with the
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same problem of nihilism. Even when his thought matured, he con­
tinued to maintain:
I am convinced that the problem of nihilism lies at the root of 
the mutual aversion of religion and science. And it was this 
that gave my philosophical engagement its starting point 
from which it grew larger and larger until it came to envelop 
nearly everything.11
11 Quoted from Religion and Nothingness, Translator’s Introduction, p. xxxvi.
12 Quoted from The Self-overcoming of Nihilism, Notes, on Texts, p. xxx (a transla­
tion of Ueda Shizuteru’s postscript to the latest Japanese edition of this work).
13 See Religion and Nothingness, pp. 95 and 126.
14 See ibid., pp. 35, 138, 158, 251, 263, and 280.
15 See ibid., p. 123. 16 See ibid., p. 183. 17 ibid., p. 137. *• Ibid., p. 97.
19 Ibid., p. 138. 20 Ibid., p. 263. 21 Ibid., p. 183. 22 Ibid.
This led him also to say: 4‘The fundamental task for me, before 
philosophy and through philosophy, has been, in short, the overcom­
ing of nihilism through nihilism.”12
He finally discovered the resolution he sought to the problem of 
nihilism or of relative negativity (or of dualistic or relative nothingness) 
in what Buddhism—especially Zen Buddhism—refers to as non- 
dualistic or Absolute Nothingness,13 Absolute Negation,14 Absolute15 or 
True16 Emptiness, or, in Sanskrit, Sunyata. In Nishitani’s own phrase­
ology: “The essence of nihility consists in a purely negative (antipodal) 
negativity.”17 In sharp contrast, “sunyata represents the endpoint of 
an orientation to negation. It can be termed an absolute negativity, 
[absolute negation, or absolute nothingness], inasmuch as it is a stand­
point that has negated and thereby transcended nihility. . . .”18
That is, “the standpoint of sunyata is . . . not a standpoint of sim­
ply negative negativity. . . . It is the standpoint at which absolute nega­
tion is at the same time ... a Great Affirmation.”19 For it is only 
“through the absolute negation of the self that takes place in the con­
version from the field of nihility to the field of emptiness, and from the 
field of karma to the field of non-ego,”20 that the self becomes a “true 
self... as that ‘self that is not a self,’ ”21 or as “the self as non­
ego.”22 “In other words, without ceasing to be a human being, the self 
comes to a mode of being where it gets rid of the human. And that
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mode is none other than Existenz as non-ego, the Existenz of the ‘non­
duality of self and other,’ ”23 or the non-duality of self and not-self. 
This, then, is “the field of the absolute negation or Great Death of the 
self . . . where ‘we become dead while living,* ’,24 “the standpoint of 
death and rebirth implied in the phrase, ‘In the Great Death heaven 
and earth become new.’ ’,25 Accordingly, “the field of tonyata is 
nothing other than the field of the Great Affirmation’’26—or, in an 
alternate, equivalent27 characterization, “is the field of an absolute 
‘nothingness,* ”M “a nothingness altogether beyond the field of the 
relativity [or dualistic opposition] of being and nothingness.”29
25 Ibid., p. 280. 24 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 283. * ZMrf.. p. 131.
27 See ibid., pp. 33 and 127. 28 Ibid., p. 126. 19 Ibid. 50 Ibid., p. 157
” Ibid., p. 106. 32 Ibid., p. 164.
Relating §flnyata (“emptiness”—or “true emptiness”) to its compa­
nion Buddhist term tathatd (“suchness”—or bhuta-tathata, “true 
suchness”), Nishitani wrote: “It is precisely on the field of Sflnyata 
that. . . . phenomena, at one with emptiness, are nothing less than ac­
tual reality at an essential level. It is what we [can also] speak of ... as 
‘true suchness’. . . .*,3° For him, therefore:
True emptiness is nothing less than what reaches awareness in 
all of us as our own absolute self-nature. In addition, this 
emptiness is the point at which each and every entity that is 
said to exist becomes manifest as what it is in itself, in the 
Form of its true suchness.31
When expressed conceptually or “in thought,” these matters be­
speak a kind of thought that points beyond the pale of thought that 
is “not [to be] contemplated on the field of reason, but. . . com­
prehended [or prehended] on the field of ^finyata.”32 And, in fact, this 
may be taken to be a mark of much of Nishitani’s own thought or 
thinking.
Abe Masao, a former student of Nishitani and now a leading 
member of the Kyoto School, commenting on Nishitani’s book 
ShQkyo to wa nanika? (published first in 1961 in Japanese and then 
again, in 1982, in an English translation under the title Religion and 
Nothingness) said to me shortly after its Japanese publication: “It is
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two steps ahead of Heidegger!” While this, no doubt, is true, I would 
add that in a significant sense it stands on a slightly different footing. 
For it is an attempt to canvas and to explore a number of the most 
basic religious and philosophical problems inherent in human existence 
through, as already intimated, an open and explicit marshalling of— 
and grappling with—some of the best thinking in this regard appearing 
in both the West and East. In Nishitani’s own articulation: “My aim 
is ... to inquire into the original form of reality, and of man who is part 
of that reality, including as well the antireligious and antiphilosophical 
standpoints of which the nihilism of Nietzsche and the scientism found 
in secularization are examples.”33 Hence, it is an intense reflection 
upon a genuinely cross-cultural inquiry that undergirds the uncom­
promising universality claimed in the concluding pronouncement of 
this work:
True freedom is ... an absolute autonomy on the field of 
emptiness, where “there is nothing to rely on.” And this is 
no different from making oneself into a nothingness in the 
service of all things. . . . Only on the field of emptiness does 
all . . . this become possible. Until the thoughts and deeds of 
man one and all be located on such a field, the sorts of prob­
lems that beset humanity have no chance of ever really being 
solved.34
Long-term prophecy, it goes without saying, is always extremely 
hazardous. Nevertheless, I think it can be said with a high degree of 
probability that like his renowned teacher Nishida KitarO, the founder 
of the so-called Kyoto School (of which Nishitani was the recent rank­
ing representative), Nishitani’s voice, though it may take a little time to 
be heard, recognized, and fully savored, will remain down through the 
ages a veritably distinctive voice in the ongoing collective religio- 
philosophical chorus of all human-kind.
” Ibid., p. 261. M Ibid., p. 285.
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starting with 
the negative 
relative 
or dualistic 
nothingness 
of nihilism 
a cognitive probing 
into and through 
nihilism’s root-source 
to its conclusive 
over-coming 
in the True Emptiness 
of non-relative 
non-dualistic 
or Absolute Nothingness 
an existentially charged 
intellectual odyssey 
spanning East and West 
ancient and modem 
pointing beyond 
even itself 
the thought-arresting-thought 
of Nishitani Keiji 
philosopher 
of Zen Buddhism
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